Long-range forecasting usually asks what the world will look like in 20, 30 or 50 years. Nicolas de Santis took a different starting point when he developed the framework he calls Planetary Futures. Instead of projecting forward, he looked at what is already happening. In his conversation with Michael Macfarlane on Wealth Office, he describes three trajectories for humanity, explains why all three are visible today and sets out what he believes would tip the balance.

Three futures in the present tense

The first trajectory enhances human potential. Macfarlane summarises it as mega visionary potential, built on cooperation, ethical technology and planetary governance. The second is stagnation, a world that keeps wrestling with short-term crises without major improvements for humanity. The third is self-destruction, marked by fragmented governance, conflict and collapse.

De Santis insists that these are present realities. The news, he observes, brings good news, less good news and terrible news, and people live with all three at once. Climate change is one sign of self-destruction. Conflicts such as those in Ukraine and Gaza are others. Technology runs through every scenario. It can extend human potential, preserve the status quo or accelerate destruction.

His definition of stagnation is pointed. It is a world that invests more in war than in health. For families thinking in decades, the framework poses a direct question: which of these futures does their capital currently serve, and which do they want it to serve? De Santis expects any family would choose the first, but notes that many hold businesses that generate cash without contributing much to it.

The governance question

What separates the first future from the second, in de Santis's view, is governance. Maximum human potential requires collaboration on shared goals, such as solving cancer and Alzheimer's, ending malnutrition and hunger, and peace. That requires a change in how the planet is governed, with the nation state no longer the only significant actor. Continuing with nation-state thinking, he argues, leads to stagnation.

He is careful about the distinction he draws.

I don't say global government, I say global governance. We don't want a global government.

— Nicolas de Santis, Wealth Office

He points out that nation states are a relatively recent invention, a few centuries old. He expects them to continue, but believes a new level is needed above them, and he does not think the United Nations can provide it, describing it as no longer fit for purpose. His preferred model is federal: nations remain independent and retain their responsibilities while contributing to a common vision at a higher level. He compares this to the United States, which he describes as a country based on an idea.

Macfarlane extends the comparison. The American Dream, he suggests, works because it transcends politicians and institutions and lives among people. A global equivalent, not decided by politicians, would be highly desirable if anyone could work out how to build it.

A common vision first

Asked to name the most important governance failure, de Santis returns to vision. If everyone holds a different vision of the future, aligning them is difficult. Yet the commonalities are large: one planet, the same air, the same basic needs. Without a common vision, he warns, the competition for resources continues, with actors seeking land and materials to keep manufacturing in a way he regards as short term.

He argues that the citizens of the world should ultimately be the actors that shape this vision, and that it must be built for future generations who will never meet those making the decisions today. He also acknowledges a practical barrier. The world is now so complex that people struggle to know what to focus on, and tend to compartmentalise into environment, hunger or taxation. His model treats these issues as interconnected, and he argues that once that is understood, isolation is no longer possible.

On democracy, de Santis is measured. He calls it an invention that remains a good tool, but one that has not evolved to match the circumstances of the planet. He questions the people managing democracy more than democracy itself.

Where private capital fits

Macfarlane's own position is that the vision is more likely to come from private capital holders and enterprise than from politics, since many people have little faith in governments to lead. De Santis appears to share much of that view, and closes the conversation by noting that private capital will probably be what changes the world.

He also sees Asia as central to what comes next. In his view Asia is looking at the future in different ways and is ahead in that thinking. He argues that China learned from the West and now applies those lessons more effectively, helped by governance that allows it to think less politically and more practically than systems tied to frequent elections. He points to decades of Chinese investment in raw materials, infrastructure and companies around the world as evidence of long-range planning.

Energy illustrates the point. De Santis notes that energy infrastructure is expensive and slow to build, so the decisions that matter today should have been made 30 years ago. He describes energy as being like oxygen and observes that many industrial companies struggle to make a profit because of its cost.

For principals, the framework works best as a lens. It asks where their capital sits across the three futures, and whether their time horizon matches the scale of the problems that will decide between them.