The shocks that did not fragment the world

In recent years the global economy has absorbed COVID, the war in Ukraine, Trumpism and an energy crisis. Each prompted predictions of deglobalisation, a second Cold War, fragmentation and de-risking. Keyu Jin's assessment is blunt. That is not what happened. Media headlines and political narratives, she argues, are temporary, because they lack a long-term structural foundation. The forces she regards as durable are human ones. Developing countries want to grow, people want to escape poverty and families want to preserve value for the next generation.

What has changed is the number of routes available. Jin uses Vietnam as an example. Trade there does more than pass through on its way from China. With Chinese foreign direct investment, Vietnam is building its own domestic industry and creating value locally. Middle powers and smaller economies, she says, are benefiting from more opportunities, and the boom in services trade and digital connectivity adds further channels. Efforts to stop economics overriding politics have, in her view, failed despite the many blows dealt to the global economy.

Choke points and the limits of leverage

This optionality changes how power works. During the Cold War, small economies did almost nothing to cushion geopolitical shocks. Today, Jin argues, they play a large role, through parallel payment systems, rerouted manufacturing and alternative sources of critical inputs.

Choke points just don't have the kind of bite they used to have.

— Keyu Jin, Wealth Office

Once a choke point is weaponised, she expects massive diversification to follow. She applies the same logic to China's own position, noting that Beijing understands its rare-earth leverage is a short-term instrument. Asked by Michael Macfarlane whether China could ever use its holdings of US debt as the United States reportedly used British debt during the Suez crisis, Jin says she does not believe so. Dumping US debt would be a double-edged sword that inflicted economic losses on China itself. Historically, she notes, long-term financing often decided wars. Today she sees technology as the place where most power is held.

She also rejects the premise that the world is heading for a straightforward handover from one hegemon to another. China, in her account, does not seek dominance of the world, and wants to preserve multipolarity. That ambition, together with the distributed nature of wealth and opportunity, leads her to judge a conflict-ridden power transition less likely than in past eras. She says the last few years have given her some reprieve, because they show how hard it is to weaponise the world economy against large numbers of people.

Why suppression tends to fail

Jin's sharpest argument concerns strategy. She treats much of the hostile rhetoric aimed at China as distraction, a way for governments that are struggling at home to find someone to blame.

It's really not about trying to stop a competitor, right? It's always been trying to harness your own strength and build your own strength.

— Keyu Jin, Wealth Office

History, she argues, offers many attempts at suppression through embargoes, blockades and technological export controls, and none has worked in the end. Her example is the United States and Japan. Washington first tried that approach on Japan, then responded to Japan's rise in chips by changing things at home, including passing laws that were fundamental to its innovation system. Innovation thrived as a result. Jin hopes that if the United States recognises it is unable to stop China, the rivalry narrative will soften and attention will turn to domestic renewal, which she regards as the better outcome for everyone.

Her prescription for the West is pragmatism. She observes that it took Trump to prompt a desire for more pragmatic policy in Europe and renewed engagement with China, and she questions why that should have been necessary. Pragmatism, in her view, can sit comfortably alongside legitimacy, morality and a clear narrative. Being open for business, she adds, means recognising complementarities with the rest of the world.

Adapting to a decentralised world

For families and companies, Jin's world of options is also a demand for adaptability. She describes the most flexible companies reinventing their identities, with a supply chain in China, a research and development centre in the Gulf, and treasury functions in Dubai or Hong Kong. Some Chinese companies with strong technology, finding it difficult to carry a Chinese identity around the world, are splitting their operations across regions and investing in local jobs and markets in Europe.

She also identifies a structural shift towards globalisation anchored by localism. Multinationals that once arrived with a Western model and Western governance did a great deal for host economies, she acknowledges, but they are now doing less well and need to reinvent themselves. Success increasingly depends on local companies, local talent and local financial participation, a pattern she sees in India as well as China.

The common thread is perspective. Jin returns to her opening point that many Western leaders assume developing countries will want to look like the West as they grow richer. She regards that as an assumption, and an unhelpful one. A family or company that can see the world's heterogeneity clearly, and work with it, is in her view best positioned for what she calls an anti-fragile new model built on adaptability, agility and flexibility. That ability, she says, starts with seeing different perspectives.